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Climate change is an inevitable scenario that already endangers millions of 
lives.1 The phenomenon occurs in an area of international law where there is an 
urgent need for international co-operation in order to solve the problem. It is a global 
problem that needs a global solution.2 Since treaty-based collaborations, aimed at 
battling the consequences of climate change, have been difficult to achieve or 
implement,3 the question arises whether the United Nations Security Council, with 
its ability to pass binding resolutions, could thus be a successful alternative to 
address the issues resulting from climate change.4 In contrast to conventional treaty-
making, United Nations Security Council Resolution are often more efficient in their 
decision making as they require less compromise and can result in a stronger impact 
due to faster implementation.5 
One could argue that climate change will increasingly threaten international peace 
and security and that the involvement of the Security Council is thus inevitable in the 
near future. 
My thesis will focus on what role the United Nations Security Council could 
play in tackling the challenges arising from climate change. I would like to evaluate 
the potential risk that by giving the United Nations Security Council - one of the 
most powerful organs of international law - the power to address perpetrators of 
climate change this could worsen the political divides and self-interests already 
present in the Council. I will be looking at the legal possibilities of the Council while 
taking into account what permanent members, influenced by their own interests, are 
most likely to do. From this I might conclude that potential future actions by the 
United Nations Security Council with regards to climate security threats are part of 
the solution or too risky as this would only hinder progress. 
I will examine the extent to which climate change affects peace and security 
worldwide and whether the Security Council can, will and should be involved in 
solving these threats. 
1 COP24 Special Report ‘Health and Climate Change’ WHO (2018) 16. 
2 Gunter Pleuger ’Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace’ in Sabine von Schorlems (ed) 
’Dresden Papers on Law and Policy of the United Nations’ 19ed (2014) 33. 
3 Jan Klabbers International Law 5 ed (2014) 252. 
4 Sumon Dantiki ‘Power through Process: An Administrative law Framework for United Nations 
Legislative Resolutions’ (2009) 40 GEOJIL 656. 
5 Ibid at 663.	
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Chapter One will be dealing with the connection between climate change and 
security. The relationship between cause and effect will be examined. Various 
current and future environmental scenarios will be analysed with regards to their 
potential threat to international peace and security. A specific emphasis will be put 
on the disparity between the Global North and the Global South, of which the latter 
suffers more regularly and more intensively from climate catastrophes. 
Chapter Two will lay down the scope and limits of the Security Council’s 
powers in general. I will analyse how the Charter of the United Nations provides the 
Council members possibilities to take action and how Council member states used 
these powers to create specific resolutions with legislative character in the past. I will 
determine the potential of the United Nations Security Council binding resolutions 
first before identifying its potential in tackling climate change in the next chapter. 
Chapter Three will be the synthesis of the first two chapters by asking what 
the Security Council is able to do specifically regarding climate change-related 
threats to peace and security. I will be discussing issues of state responsibility and 
accountability as well as the risks and opportunities that come with handing over the 
climate change responsibility to the Security Council. This will then be continued by 
an analysis of the structural problems of the Security Council, taking into account 
that the permanent members are the biggest polluters from the industrialised Global 
North. 
The final chapter will look at possible actions the United Nations Security 
Council should undertake in order to stop climate change. I will try to draw a 
realistic picture of what the different stakeholders expect from the Council, taking 
the politics on the ground into account. I will discuss the complex relationship 
between the Member States of the United Nations and the Security Council. In 
addition, I will point out alternative approaches using different United Nations 
institutions. 
To conclude, a short summary and outlook will be provided with regards to 
the estimated actions that the Council will probably undertake to handle future 
conflicts resulting from climate change. 
Climate change is a topic which we have to try to solve using all theoretical 
approaches and ideas. I hope that this paper can offer one approach to how states 
should resolve upcoming conflicts, thereby aiding their fight to end climate change. 
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B. CHAPTER 1: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE RESULTS IN A THREAT TO
PEACE AND SECURITY WORLDWIDE
Under Art 39 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter)6, the United 
Nations Security Council determines what poses a threat to international peace and 
security. In accordance with Art 25 of the UN Charter, the Council can pass binding 
resolutions under Chapter VII. Before examining the exact scope of the Council’s 
powers and functions, I will analyse how the term climate change should be 
understood and how it can pose a security threat. 
I. The definition of Climate Change
Art 1 (2) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)7 defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods.’ This paper will be working with this United Nations 
definition that has been ratified by 197 parties as of 2020.8 
Human-produced greenhouse gases are the result of human activity, altering 
the composition of the global atmosphere. The majority of scientists acknowledge 
that the increased greenhouse effect worldwide can be traced back to human 
activity.9 
Greenhouse gas concentration levels are at a record high and will lead to an 
increase in global temperature by 3 to 5 degree Celsius by the end of the century.10 
The years 2015 to 2018 have been recorded to be the warmest years in all of 
6 Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992).	
8 Status of Ratification of the Convention – United Nations Climate Change available at 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/status-of-ratification/status-of-ratification-of-
the-convention, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
9 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet ‘Science, Facts and Fears: The Debate on Climate Change and 
Security’ in Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann, Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting’s (ed) Climate 
Change: International Law and Global Governance (2013) 687. 
10 UN Press Release ’World simply ‘not on track’ to slow climate change this year: UN weather 
agency’ 29 November 2018. 
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recorded history, temperature-wise only being beaten by the previous three years.11 
The record-breaking heatwave in Western Europe that occurred in July 2019 was at 
least to some extent a result of the human influence on the climate. An international 
study showed that in the Netherlands as well as in France, similar events with 
temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius would reappear less often without climate 
change.12 
Due to melting of the glaciers 13 the mean global sea level in the period from 
January till July 2018 has been 2 to 3 mm higher than in 2017.14 In addition, the 
average ocean temperature is at a record high.15 Finally, as of January 2019, the sea 
ice in the Antarctica is at its lowest levels since recording started 40 years ago.16 
Climate change is happening and continues to do so at a worrying pace. 
However, according to Art 39 of the UN Charter the Security Council can only 
intervene and pass binding resolutions if climate change is a threat to international 
peace and security. I will therefore now ask under what circumstances climate 
change can become a security concern. 
II. At what point do the effects of climate change become a security issue?
While violence is one of the most dangerous consequences of climate 
change,17 climate change does not directly lead to conflict. Instead it triggers 
destabilising factors within a society that can then lead to the outbreak of violence. 
For instance, climate change causes higher temperatures resulting in droughts and 
scarcity, which might eventually lead to conflict over resources.18 For several 
decades, the number of people suffering from hunger had dropped, but due to climate 
11 World Metrological Organization (WMO) ’The State of the Global Climate in 2018’ 1. 
12 World Weather Attribution ’Human contribution to the record-breaking July 2019 heat-wave in 
Western Europe’ 2 August 2019 available at https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/human-
contribution-to-the-record-breaking-july-2019-heat-wave-in-western-europe/, accessed on 6 February 
2020. 
13 World Metrological Organization (WMO) op cit note 11 at 5. 
14 Ibid at 2. 
15 Ibid at 3. 
16 National Snow & Ice Data Center (NSICD) ‘A record-low start to the new year in Antarctica’ 3 
January 2019 available at https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2019/01/a-record-low-start-to-the-new-
year-in-antarctica/, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
17 Branch, A. ’Rethinking the Climate-Conflict Relationship ’ (2018) 3 Peace Science Digest 12. 
18 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet op cit note 9 at 688. 
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change world hunger is on the rise again.19 Various ecological changes influence 
human health, access to food and freshwater and thus affect economic productivity, 
food security and the resilience of infrastructure and cities.20 It is not easy to reveal a 
clear and direct relationship between climate change, migration and violent conflict 
for instance. It is therefore often easier to separate the issues of how climate change 
can lead to migration and how migration can result in violent conflict.21 
The criteria for ‘threat to peace’ evolve constantly.22 The absence of war and 
military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and 
security. Non-military sources of instability in economic, social, humanitarian and 
ecological form can become threats to peace and security too.23 
Whether climate change results in a ‘security issue’ is a matter of how we 
define the relationship between cause and effect.24 As pointed out the phenomenon 
of climate change in itself does not automatically and directly pose a threat to peace 
and security. For instance we see that resource scarcity is a broader issue and that the 
physical single impact of climate change (rising temperatures and sea levels for 
instance), is only one contributing factor.25 It is therefore necessary to understand 
that different climate phenomena have different security impacts, with some 
resulting more directly in security threats than others. 
Armed conflicts, as an ascertainment of a threat to peace and security, have 
various contributing factors that cannot be looked at independently. It is important to 
see the broader picture and to consider factors like colonial history, extractive 
industries and unequal trade partnerships for example.26 Climate change has to be 
understood as a so-called ‘threat multiplier’, causing and deepening instabilities.27 
19 Dan Smith, Malin Mobjörk, Florian Krampe et al ’Climate Security – Making it #Doable’ (2019) 
Clingendal Netherlands Institute of International Relations 9. 
20 UN Press Release op cit note 10. 
21 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. ’Exploring the Relationship Between Climate Change, Migration and, 
Violent Conflict’ (2016) 3 Peace Science Digest 8. 
22 Stefan Talmon ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99/1 AJIL 180. 
23 UN Doc. S/23500 (31 January 1992) 3. 
24 Erika Pires Ramos ‘Climate Change, Disasters and Migration: Current Challenges to International 
Law’ in Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann, Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting’s (ed) Climate 
Change: International Law and Global Governance (2013) 742. 
25 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet op cit note 9 at 696. 
26 Branch, A. op cit note 17 at 15. 
27 ‘Climate Change: An Escalating National Security Threat' Outrider Post available at 
https://outrider.org/climate-change/articles/climate-change-national-security-threat/, accessed on 6 
February 2020. 
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Let us turn to various instances where such a connection has been established. 
The 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security for example reaffirmed that climate 
change is the single greatest threat to the wellbeing of the Pacific.28 In 2007 the 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon pointed out that the Darfur Conflict 
had its roots inter alia in climate change, therefore labelling it the ‘first climate 
change conflict.’29  
The European Union’s High Representative and the European Commission to 
the European Council identified different scenarios that climate change will trigger: 
conflict over resources, risks for coastal cities, loss of territory and border disputes, 
migration, situations of fragility and radicalization, tension over energy supply and 
pressure on international governance.30  
These are just some of the scenarios that will be triggered through climate 
change, not to mention the fact that it will affect each and every one of us on several 
levels in different ways. Some of these scenarios are more easily identified as a 
direct threat to international peace and security, while others only pose a threat to 
security when combined with other factors. 
(a) Different scenarios
For the United Nations Security Council to get involved through a binding 
resolution, the existence of a threat to peace and security is of necessity according to 
Art 39 of the UN Charter. The question is therefore how these various scenarios 
result in (a) threat(s) to peace and security. 
It is important to point out that developing countries are especially at risk. 
Factors like their ‘their tropical geography, high population growth, heavy 
dependence on agriculture, rapid urbanisation, weak infrastructures and lack of 
resources’31 provide a higher risk for fragile countries to become stuck in a cycle of 
28 Boe Declaration on Regional Security (2018) by the Pacific Islands Forum Annex 1 (i). 
29 Ban Ki-Moon ’A Climate Culprit In Darfur’ The Washington Post 16 June 2007. 
30 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council ‘Climate Change 
and International Security’ European Union (2008) at 3-5. 
31 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet op cit note 9 at 691. 
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conflict and climate disaster.32 Africa is expected to be the first continent to 
experience the full impact of this development.33 
(i) Natural disasters and rising sea levels
The rising of sea levels, as well as the increase in the frequency and intensity 
of natural disasters, will force millions of people to flee their homes, creating climate 
refugees, that are on the move due to environmental degradation34 and border 
disputes due to the high possibility of loss of entire countries. Risks are particularly 
high in the East coasts of India and China, the Caribbean region and Central 
America.35 As the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has stated: ‘as 
coastal areas or degraded inland areas become uninhabitable, people will seek safety 
and better lives elsewhere.’36 Rising sea levels in Tuvalu will eventually make 
people flee and emigrate and they might even lose their nationality if their country 
sinks completely. In such a case, there is no possibility to ever return, unlike in those 
situations, where people flee from conflict for example. This will not only affect 
distant islands in the Pacific, metropolitan cities that border the ocean may face 
similar difficulties.37 
The recent migrant caravan that made its way from Central America to the 
United States of America has its roots in food insecurity aggravated by unusually 
strong hurricanes and droughts. These circumstances have made people more 
vulnerable to gang violence, which is often pointed out as the reason for the 
movement of the local people.38 
The shrinking of Lake Chad, for instance, is another major concern to the 
United Nations as it is connected to the livelihood of 30 million people, the President 
32 Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed’s remarks at Security Council Debate 
‘Understanding and Addressing Climate-related Security Risks’ UN Statements, 11 July 2018. 
33 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet op cit note 9 at 686-7. 
34 Erika Pires Ramos op cit note 24 at 743. 
35 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 
4. 
36 ’UN chief outlines ‘intertwined challenges’ of climate change, ocean health facing Pacific nations 
on the ‘frontline’’, 14 May 2019, UN News available at 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038521, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
37 ‘The World’s first Climate Refugees’ Stories available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6QEDbI5zrg, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
38 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. op cit note 21 at 10. 
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of the 73rd United Nations General Assembly, Maria Espinosa-Garces said.39 This is 
to be closely monitored as a growing population will intensify the water scarcity 
even further. In addition, the fact that a lot of its rivers are shared between countries, 
can cause tensions between neighbours.40  
‘Ecological-economic migrants’ or ‘climate disaster refugees’ are less likely 
to cause violent conflicts because the former will choose more welcoming areas for 
migrants and the later will only stay temporarily. ‘Climate-affected migrants’ or 
‘permanent climate refugees’ on the other hand pose a bigger threat to peace since 
they are more likely to migrate to areas which are also affected by climate change. 
They could therefore be seen as additional competition by locals.41 
In addition, one has to distinguish between migration, that, although partly 
due to the environment, is triggered by a conflict and migration that is more evolving 
due to direct environmental issues such as flooding or storms.42 In the latter the 
causal link between climate change and a resulting security threat is clearer. 
(ii) Fight for exhausted resources
Natural resources play a crucial role when it comes to conflict: they have 
been the cause of more than 40 per cent of internal armed conflict over the last 60 
years and 75 per cent of civil wars in Africa since 1990 have been partially funded 
by their revenues.43 
The lack of resources is just one of many accumulative factors that often 
evolve into violence.44 People who are directly dependent on renewable natural 
resources are more likely to migrate to new areas that too are richer in these 
resources once their resources are depleted due to extreme weather conditions.45 
Whether the movement of these people leads to a conflict is a matter of the receiving 
39 In a joint news conference with the Foreign Affairs Minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, on 7 May 2019 in 
Abuja, Nigeria; available at https://punchng.com/lake-chads-shrinking-major-climate-change-
disaster-un/, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
40 Link, P. M., Scheffran, J., & Ide, T. ’From Water Scarcity to Conflict or Cooperation’ (2016) 3 
Peace Science Digest 20. 
41 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. op cit note 21 at 9. 
42 Erika Pires Ramos op cit note 24 at 742-3. 
43 Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ remarks to Security Council‚’The Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security: The Root Causes of Conflict – The Role of Natural Resources’ UN, 
16 October 2018. 
44 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. op cit note 21 at 8. 
45 Ibid at 9. 
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area and the conditions on-site.46 This depends on whether the host country is 
experiencing scarcity itself or is undergoing an identity conflict that arriving 
migrants could affect.47 It is therefore possible that environmentally caused 
migration can increase conflict in transit and destination areas.48 
The lack of water specifically can heighten the risk of civil unrest.49 Over 65 
per cent of the Arab world depends on water resources that lie outside of their 
territories.50 Lake Chad, for instance, has shrunk by more than 90 per cent since the 
1960s. The environmental, socio-economical and security consequences affect more 
than 45 million people.51 By the end of 2020, there will be millions of 
‘environmental’ migrants according to the United Nations.52 
Another aspect is the world’s hydrocarbon reserves. A lot of regions that hold 
the majority of these reserves are already unstable. These regions also tend to be 
more vulnerable to climate change, which will deepen their instability and the 
competition for resources even further.53 
(iii) Territorial claims and newfound resources (Arctic)
The Artic is not only melting twice as fast as other regions; it also contains 25 
per cent of the worlds undiscovered fossil fuel reserves. This will not only lead to 
new shipping lanes becoming available but also to potential conflicts between the 
global powers Russia, the United States of America and China over the energy 
resources that become available.54 All five Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia and the United States) have increased their military presence in the 
area.55 
Whether a climate change-related scenario poses or results in a threat to peace 
and security always depends on the vulnerability of the affected society and its 
46 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. op cit note 21 at 9. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 
4. 
49 Ibid at 3. 
50 Ibid at 7. 
51 Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed op cit note 32. 
52 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 
4. 
53 Ibid at 5. 
54 Outrider Post op cit note 27; The High Representative and the European Commission to the 
European Council op cit note 30 at 4 and 8. 




ability to respond.56 Climate change does not automatically lead to conflict. They are 
human-made and can therefore only be solved by humans.57 Conflicts resulting from 
climate change are more often the ‘consequences of consequences.’58 It is therefore 
often the case that those countries that are most vulnerable to climate change are also 
the ones that are most vulnerable to conflict following hereafter.59 Already existing 
precarious situations will be exacerbated by climate change.  
The problem is that climate change is usually just one out of many factors 
that may lead to the outbreak of conflict.60 The repercussions of climate change are 
multi-layered and continuous, which makes it hard to draw a definite line. For 
instance, vulnerable regions that will not be able to react appropriately will face high 
unemployment, which could in turn cause the youth to join violent extremist 
groups.61 Past examples include the Boko Haram, which, among other factors, is 
believed to have gained power due to the shrinking of Lake Chad.62 Climate change 
needs to be understood as a threat multiplier, applying additional stress on prevailing 
political, social and economic pressure points.63 But despite the different scenarios 
that have been described, climate change itself can also be a form of insecurity,64 
because ‘it not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a 
threat to international peace and security.’65 
 
(b) Comparison between the Global North and the Global South 
 
What has become clear now is that the Global North is the main perpetrator 
of climate change whereas the Global South is the main victim, since it is 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Without directly interfering 
																																																								
56 Dan Smith, Malin Mobjörk, Florian Krampe et al op cit note 19 at 7. 
57 Brzoska, M. & Fröhlich, C. op cit note 21 at 11. 
58 Dan Smith, Janani Vivekananda ‘A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate Change, Peace 
and War’ (2007) International Alert 3. 
59 Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed op cit note 32; The High Representative and the 
European Commission to the European Council (2008) op cit note 32 at 4. 
60 Dan Smith, Malin Mobjörk, Florian Krampe et al op cit note 19 at 22. 
61 Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed’s op cit note 32; The High Representative and the 
European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 5. 
62 ’Open Debate: Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and 
security’ What’s in Blue 24 January 2019. 
63 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 
2; Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed op cit note 32. 
64 Patrick Hiller, Molly Wallace, Kristin Henderson et al ‘Special Issue Climate Change, Security and 
Conflict’ (2019) 3 Peace Science Digest 4. 




on the ground, the northern states’ actions within their own territories make the 
Global South suffer. But that is not all. There is a specific term used for the overuse 
of resources in the Global South by extractive industries that do not consider social 
nor environmental impacts – it is called ‘extractive imperialism’.66 This will increase 
the political tensions between those who are most responsible for climate change and 
those who are most affected by it. But one should not lose sight of the fact that there 
will also be a South-South dimension since Indian and Chinese greenhouse gas 
emissions are on the rise.67 So the responsibility for climate change has shifted and 
nowadays not only includes industrialised countries but also growing economies with 
a non-capitalist past.68 The energy sector plays a crucial role in hindering the 
catastrophic consequences of climate change because it accounts for two-thirds of 
total greenhouse gas emissions and 80 per cent of CO2.69 Increased CO2 emissions 
that are a result of fuel combustion are mostly linked to economic output. In 2017 
China, India and the EU were the leading countries in increased emissions. It is also 
shown in the CO2 Emission statistics that neither Africa nor Oceania, regions that 
are generally most affected by the consequences of climate change, have ever 
produced high CO2 emissions with little to no increase.70 Small islands and 
developing states are especially at risk. Moreover key vulnerabilities are low 
developed country isolation, lack of land, high-risk location, nature and land 
degradation, population growth, poverty, poor infrastructure, concentration of 
activities or populations in high-risk areas, dependence on natural resources (eg 
rainfall) or economic sectors (eg fossil fuels) or processes (eg desalination for water), 
low capacity, food shortages, and health sector challenges.71 
In 2019 the ‘Earth Overshoot Day’ – the day in a year that humankind has 
consumed more ecological resources than could theoretically be refilled in the course 
of that rest of the year – was 29 July 2019, the earliest day to date .72 It is worth 
pointing out that if we were to use our resources like the majority of the countries 
																																																								
66 Branch, A. op cit note 17 at 14. 
67 The High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council op cit note 30 at 
5. 
68 Marcel Leroy & Fana Gebresenbet op cit note 9 at 701. 
69 The International Energy Agency (IEA) ‘Global Energy & CO2 Status Report’ (March 2019) 
available at https://www.iea.org/topics/climatechange/, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
70 The International Energy Agency ‘CO2 Emissions Statistics’ (2018) available at 
https://www.iea.org/statistics/co2emissions/, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
71 ‘Climate action and support trends’ (2019) UNFCCC Report 12. 
72 ‘Earth Overshoot Day 2019 is July 29, the earliest ever’, Global Footprint Network 26 June 2019 





from the Global South (some of them not even having an overshoot day), that date 
would be way later in the year.73  It thus becomes clear that the Global South is 
contributing far less to climate change than the Global North. 
 
III. The legal classification of the various scenarios 
 
Which of the scenarios described above pose a threat to peace and security? 
During an African Union summit in 2007, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni 
went as far as calling climate change ‘an act of aggression’ by the developed world 
against the developing world and called for compensation.74 Namibia’s Kaire 
Munionganda Mbuende described greenhouse gases as ‘a low intensity or chemical 
warfare’ between the rich and poor countries.75 
Since climate-related security risks are highly complex and multifaceted they 
cannot be solved by one country alone.76 When climate change results in the various 
scenarios described above, these scenarios represent only one of many factors 
constituting to conflict and can never be looked at outside of context. Nonetheless, it 
is important that the Council does not ignore the role of nature in today’s political 
crisis and conflicts.77 
 
(a) Specific scenarios that the Security Council tackles 
 
One needs to make a distinction between long-term development issues and 
short-term diplomatic issues, with the latter falling into the scope of the Security 
Council.78 Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the Council legally binding powers 
to a certain extent only: ad hoc in the case of an actual threat.79  
																																																								
73 ‘Country Overshoot Days 2019’ Earth Overshoot Day, available at 
https://www.overshootday.org/newsroom/country-overshoot-days/, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
74 ’Global warming in Africa – Drying up and flooding out’ The Economist 10 May 2007. 
75 UN Doc. SC/9000 ‘Security Council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on peace, 
security, hearing over 50 speakers’ UN Press Release (17 April 2007). 
76 ’Climate Security in times of geopolitical crises – what ways forward?’ 18 February 2019, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute available at 
https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2019/climate-security-times-geopolitical-crises-what-ways-
forward, accessed on 6 February 2020. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 




It is beyond dispute that the Council is allowed to react to specific threats. 
However, the same consensus does not necessarily apply when it comes to 
legislation that prevents these threats from arising. Yet again the Security Council is 
not obliged to wait until something happens.80 
A more recent example of a specific threat was the burning of the Amazonas 
rainforest. The Security Council could have issued a binding resolution that would 
have forbidden member states to interact economically with Brazil until help to 
tackle the fires had been accepted by the latter. In addition, the Council could have 
obligated member states to send firefighters or contribute financially to stop the 
environmental catastrophe.81 
This thesis however does not focus on Security Council’s legitimate reactions 
to actual threats that are in some way related to climate change. Rather I am 
concentrating my analysis on the question of whether the Security Council can get 
involved long before an actual threat has been identified. 
 
(b) Preventive measures (legislation) 
 
For the specific case of climate change preventive measures are indispensible. 
The question that arises is whether the UN Security Council can pass binding 
resolutions that do not address a specific, direct threat to international peace and 
security, but a general long-term problem that can only be solved globally. For this 
question to be answered in the affirmative, the Council would need to have the 
power to pass so-called legislative resolutions. Whether this is legally possible I will 
discuss in the following chapter, further examining the scope of the Council’s 
actions. 
 
C. CHAPTER 2: THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
I. The Security Council and its function 
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The main function of the United Nations Security Council is ‘the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ formulated in Art 24 of the UN 
Charter. 
According to Art 23 of the UN Charter, the Security Council consists of 15 
members, of which five (The People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
United States of America) are permanent. 
The decisions of the United Nations Security Council that fall under Chapter 
VII (Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and actions of 
aggression) are binding on all member states under Art 25 of the UN Charter. By 
determining that climate change can constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, the possibility for the Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter has 
therefore been opened.82 The original intention of Chapter VII however is that such 
decisions and actions should be administrative or executive in nature, rather than 
legislative.83 
It is important to recall that the United Nations Security Council does not 
stand above the law, notwithstanding the broad freedom of judgement it enjoys, 
concerning action under Chapter VII.84 The Security Council may not act outside of 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.85 
United Nations military interventions are ‘recommended’ or ‘authorized’ not 
‘ordered’.86 While this might be due to the fact that the Security Council has no 
troops of its own – something that was originally planned for87 - the United Nations 
Security Council cannot order certain actions as it depends on the member states’ 
willingness to comply. Hence the mandatory language it uses is limited to the 
aggressor state. Flight bans can be imposed for instance, while military actions can 
only be authorised but not ordered due to its potentially high political risk for 
domestic authorities.88 
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Lately, one might notice the increase of Security Council decisions dealing 
not with any particular conflict or situation but, rather, with conflicts in general.89 
These include issues concerning the protection of children90 and civilians,91 the role 
of women with respect to peace and security,92 humanitarian questions,93 as well as 
international terrorism.94 This recent development brings up the possibility that 
conflicts that arise from climate change could be added to this list. 
The Security Council increasingly intervenes in domestic matters when 
human right violations occur. However, climate change is probably the most non-
domestic problem countries have to face. Yet again, one could argue that the Council 
was created to face those problems domestic laws alone cannot handle. If the 
Security Council already addresses domestic matters at the moment, then 
argumentum e contrario climate change issues should be handled all the more 
legislatively. 
 
II. The Security Council as a legislature  
 
The Security Council can be seen as having adopted a quasi-legislative role.95 
Some say that this is an exercise of power which was not intended by the authors of 
the Charter; what turned into legislation through resolutions are therefore ultra vires 
acts by the Council.96 However to prove that the Council acted ultra vires is a 
difficult undertaking, since the decision whether something is a threat to peace and 
security remains highly political and therefore at the heart of the Council’s 
discretion.97  When it comes to legislation, one view is that the Security Council acts 
outside the usual ‘consensual process’ of international lawmaking and binds member 
states without their specific consent.98 This, however, is necessary to fulfil its role in 
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the first place: to react quickly to an urgent crisis where it would either take too long 
or where it would not be possible at all to find consent among all states. Conventions 
usually take time, bearing the risk of leaving legislative gaps uncovered for years.99 
And although it is often a time-consuming process to pass a resolution in the Security 
Council, it is relatively speaking quicker than passing a treaty. 
(a) Resolutions instead of treaties
One could insist the Council has to have the greatest freedom possible in 
order to react appropriately to the various challenges brought to it, otherwise its 
efficiency would be limited.100 Success through resolutions is accomplished in days 
or months rather than years which is usually the case within treaty regimes.101 The 
Security Council has intervened legislatively when there had been an urgent need for 
a global and uniform regulatory framework but a lack thereof.102 ‘Law-making 
should remain with the member states as long as they can attain the common 
objective effectively.’103 It is always more ideal to have a multilateral treaty regime 
on the matter, but in some cases urgent action is needed.104  
Some commentators say that since binding resolutions that are general and 
new in nature and passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are legislative, they 
should therefore be decided unilaterally in order to be lawful.105 
By setting general rules for actual problems the Security Council has turned 
itself into an additional source of international law next to international customary 
and treaty law.106 However, Art 38 (1) of the International Court of Justice Statute 
does not see binding Security Council resolutions as a source of international law. 
However, since these resolutions have their legal basis in the United Nations Charter, 
an international convention and therefore a source of international law, they count as 
‘secondary treaty (or Charter) law’.107 This means that Security Council resolutions 
have a legal impact because they are binding for all United Nations member states. 
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To look at the relationship between resolutions and treaties it even strikes that due to 
Art 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, the Security Council can use its authority given 
by Chapter VII to overrule certain state rights or obligations installed by treaties.108 
On the one hand, resolutions can have a more severe political weight than a 
treaty, as they do not come with complicated implementation procedures.109 On the 
other hand, resolutions are not as detailed and often lack concrete definitions 
compared to treaties resulting in the risk of ambiguity.110 In addition, resolutions 
dealing with sanctions affect the external affairs of a country, whereas legislative 
resolutions touch the internal affairs and potential conflict national politics.111 For 
that reason it is necessary that a resolution – like a directive regulation in the 
European Community law – functions more as a framework within which national 
legislation can unfold.112 The resolution dictates the aim; each member state will 
though decide the manner of reaching it.113 
It is therefore important to realise that resolutions should not replace treaties, 
they should not even be seen as an alternative but rather a tool of last resort to avoid 
or end crises of highest priorities. 
(b) The legal status of legislative resolutions
The power of each United Nations organ is self-referential and self-judging, 
there is no such thing as a classical separation of powers hence the limit on the latter 
does not emerge as definite.114 This results in the Security Council’s lack of checks 
and balances, a system that is ideally in place on a domestic level.115  
It is important to assert that legislation through the Security Council has been 
widely accepted by states.116 At the end of the day ‘the imposition of general 
obligations is nothing but the generalization of individual obligations.’117 One has to 
differ though between the legality of a United Nations Security Council resolution 
108 Carsten Stahn op cit note 84 at 99. 
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and the willingness of states to accept it. Member states might accept a resolution if 
they support the political intention behind it, not necessarily because it is legally 
permissible.118 Proof of customary international law, where it is important to not only 
establish state practice but also opinion juris, meaning states act a certain way 
because they think they are legally obliged to do so, reinforces this argument.119 
It is debatable with which resolution the legislation of the Security Council 
started. Some might argue that establishing the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda120 or the obligations imposed on Iraq and Libya by Resolutions 687 and 
748121 already had legislative character. 
There is mutual agreement though that with Resolution 1373, which dealt 
with terrorism shortly after 9/11, the Security Council, did undeniable issue a 
legislative resolution.122 There is a similar attitude towards Resolution 1540, a 
resolution regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I have 
singled out these two resolutions to form a stronger argument in favour of the 
Security Council as a legislature. One could argue that these two legislative 
resolutions have created a precedent for the Security Council to pass similar 




(i) Resolution 1373 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1373, which called upon all member states of the United Nations to install certain 
measurements in order to improve the fight against international terrorism.123 
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Resolution 1373 showed that the Council’s approach to fight terrorism is more of a 
legislative than an administrative action.124 
With Resolution 1373 the Security Council acted in response to a general 
phenomenon: terrorism.125 This was a novelty in that it told states to change their 
domestic legal processes in order to tackle the nonspecific and on going threat of 
terrorism.126 The resolution addressed a more general form of behaviour rather than a 
specific single determinable situation.127 Furthermore this resolution is in force 
indefinitely.128 The same could become a realistic option with climate change. 
And although the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1373 can be 
seen as an ultra vires act of the Council which does not have to be followed by the 
member states,129 the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) created by the Council 
noted that, although no state met all the requirements of Resolution 1373, all states 
adopted some additional domestic legislation.130 Even before Resolution 1373, there 
were several treaties in place that were concerned with the issue of terrorism, but 
state membership was low, ratifications even lower, reservations abundant, and 
monitoring mechanisms weak.131 Resolution 1373 speeded up the process of 
international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, something that no other 
source of international law had done to such an extend before. 
The instrument of Security Council resolutions could push member states 
towards environmentally friendly legislation. Even if they are not fully implemented 
by all member states, they could be the start of a fundamental rethink. 
 
(ii) Resolution 1540 
 
In 2004 the Security Council passed Resolution 1540 that required all 
member states to refrain from any form of support to non-state actors regarding the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.132 Unlike Resolution 1373, this resolution was not 
																																																								
124 Jan Klabbers op cit note 3 at 182. 
125 Stefan Talmon op cit note 22 at 180. 
126 SC Res. 1373 op cit note 123 para 1-2 and 6. 
127 Matthew Happold op cit note 80 at 598. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Jan Klabbers op cit note 3 at 200. 
130 Sumon Dantiki op cit note 4 at 662. 
131 Nicholas Tsagourisa op cit note 102 at 554. 




passed under extreme political circumstances, paving a way for legislative 
resolutions to be passed under unexceptional conditions. 
Just like Resolution 1373, it also tackled a problem that is general and on-
going: the non-proliferation agenda for non-state actors.133 While Resolution 1373 
referred to obligations that had already been acknowledged by the General Assembly 
before, Resolution 1540 handled scenarios that had not been legally covered yet.134 It 
had gone a step further and managed to determine something where no mutual 
consent had already been established. However, it is necessary to point out that 
Resolution 1540 is still not widely implemented: in 2016 out of a possible maximum 
number of 330 measures to achieve the resolutions’ goal, only 109 member states 
had 150 or more measures in place, with only 17 states having implemented all of the 
330 possible measures.135 This poor level of implementation could be due to the lack 
of state consent or acknowledgement of the topic when the resolution was passed. It 
raises the question how effective resolutions can be when passed without any prior 
state consensus. 
 
III. Limits set by the quasi-constitutive document of the Security Council: The 
Charter of the United Nations 
	
‘Legislative resolutions carry the potential for both: great promise and great 
peril.’136  
The past has shown that the Security Council is in the position to be 
frequently innovative, whether through an expanded interpretation of the meaning of 
the concept of ‘threats to the peace’ in Article 39 of the UN Charter, or through 
installing different methods of reacting to it.137 The questions whether a situation is a 
threat to peace and security is a question that only the Council itself can answer, 
making it nearly impossible to define any limits that the Council could overstep here. 
In addition, there is no one that can correct the Council’s assessment.138 Non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields can 
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also lead to a situation which is referred to as a threat to peace and security, 
including climate change.139 
The Security Council is so powerful that non-compliance of a member state 
can result in non-military (Art 41 UN Charter) or military (Art 42 UN Charter) 
sanctions by the Security Council that will be carried out by other member states. 
Moreover, the Council’s authority is exercised in an extreme uniquely way, when it 
comes to legislative resolutions that ask to change domestic law in order to react to 
ongoing and non-specific threats.140 
The traditional process of creating international law has lagged behind the 
urgent requirements of the new millennium. Legislation of the Security Council 
through binding resolutions is a powerful tool that could not only enhance the United 
Nations but could also benefit the world community if used prudently.141 
Next I am going to analyse how legislative resolutions by the Security 
Council could be legally justified by the quasi-constitutive document of the Council: 
The Charter of the United Nations. The UN Charter, like any domestic constitution, 
is subject to change and always a product of its times142. Recently it has turned into a 
more flexible tool, mirroring the current will of the member states. In addition it has 
been trying to fulfill the ‘effet utile’ (‘to have a useful impact’), meaning that norms 
are to be interpreted in such a way that they best serve the objectives of the 
convention.143 
 
(a) The implied powers doctrine 
 
Some argue that the powers of international organisations are defined and 
limited by the function that they were given when they were created.144 Within that 
space they are able to exercise legal powers and have some form of authority.145 
However, due to the implied power doctrine, international organisations that have 
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been granted certain rights, can additionally use ‘implied’ rights from the 
constituting treaties if these additional powers are necessary for its duties.146 
Consequently, it could be argued that the Security Council could benefit from such 
implied rights found in the UN Charter and could justify legislative resolutions in 
order to fulfil its duty of maintaining international peace and security. 
The implied powers doctrine however is so broad that it would justify a very 
wide range of activities by international organisations.147 And regardless whether the 
implied powers doctrine could legally be stretched beyond breaking point, the 
international organisation would lack the competence in certain fields 
notwithstanding that under international law it might have the legal capacity to act in 
these areas.148 This means that although an international organisation might have 
implied powers to act in a certain way, the reality would not permit it due to practical 
reasons like the lack of expertise or funds for instance. That in turn shows in my 
opinion an interdependency in which the implied powers doctrine can naturally only 
go as far as in practice it would be possible, otherwise losing its raison d’etre: the 
implication. 
 
(b) Principle of Proportionality 
 
The wording in Art 40, 42, 43 (1) and 51 of the UN Charter shows that the 
Council’s actions are limited by the principle of proportionality meaning that actions 
or measures by the Council are only legitimate if they are absolutely necessary.149 
The notion of proportionality is especially relevant since Security Council legislation 
is unilateral and mandatory erga omnes.150 In addition to that, several member states 
expect that the Council can only act legislatively when a certain level of urgency is 
reached.151 Due to the lack of control in regard to the Council’s actions, these limits 
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are in practice very weak however since the Council decides whether something is 
‘necessary’ or ‘urgent’.152 
A necessary intermediate step, although not required by the Charter, could be 
an approved recommendation on the part of the General Assembly when it comes to 
legislative recommendations through the Security Council.153 
 
(c) Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity, which can be found in Art 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter, clarifies that a higher level of authority is only justified in carrying out 
certain duties if this authority can do this in a more effective way than the authority 
below.154 The principle of subsidiarity attains the common good more effectively and 
less intrusively by deciding for each case which level of authority can best achieve 
the goal.155 Actions of a higher level of authority can only be imposed if a lower 
level authority cannot achieve the same effect.156 
By legislating through resolutions the Security Council serves the common 
purpose more efficiently than when states make international law through the 
protracted process of ratifying an international convention.157 Art 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter might be a tool to mediate instead of separate between different jurisdictional 
authorities of the United Nations and its member states.158 This might prove as a 
system where the Council would not be able to abuse its powers and could only 
legislate once it is clear that this forms the better solution. 
 
(d) The Scope with regards to Climate Change 
 
The measures of the United Nations Security Council resolutions could fill 
the gaps that still exist in climate change related treaties today,159 although it is 
unclear to what extent and how. 
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Due to the increased interdependence of states, especially for issues such as 
climate change, there is a growing need for global administrative institutions to take 
action even if their legitimacy is often questioned.160 
The Security Council has revealed that there is a connection between climate 
change and the maintenance of peace and security. In the Presidential Statement 
2011/15 on climate change it ‘expressed its concern that possible adverse effects of 
climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to 
international peace and security.’161 
An important characteristic is that legislative resolutions do not focus on a 
specific state, society or group of people.162 With regards to climate change this 
could mean tackling different stakeholders simultaneously. 
Climate change is a modern international law problem that might need a 
modern solution. Similar to terrorism, it poses a threat to the international 
community in a way, which had not been experienced before. And similar to how the 
Security Council handled the terrorist attacks of 2001 by issuing a legislative 
resolution, it could now follow its own example and tackle climate change in a 
comparable way. 
I am therefore convinced that the United Nations Security Council would be 
in a legally sound position to pass legislative resolutions. Whether one thinks that the 
Security Council is entitled to pass legislative resolutions or not is in the end 
irrelevant. This is because the Council decides for itself which resolutions it should 
pass or not pass and cannot be held accountable or stopped by a higher authority. In 
my opinion it is therefore more important to focus on whether this situation could be 
used in a positive way to end threats to peace and security that seem difficult to 
resolve on other levels. 
 
C. CHAPTER 3: WHAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN DO REGARDING 
CLIMATE SECURITY THREATS 
 
I. The legal possibilities open to the Security Council 
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From the two previous chapters, it is has become clear that the Security 
Council can react to specific events that have their roots in climate change and have 
evolved into peace and security issues. One of the several actions the Council could 
take are the so-called ‘adaptive measures’.163 However, these measures miss out on 
its capability to address the underlying cause that is climate change.164 An alternative 
and more preventive action might be a legally binding call for ‘mitigation’, meaning 
‘a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse 
gases’.165 
In this chapter, I will be analysing what the Security Council, with its 
compulsory powers, can do to prevent scenarios, as described above, that have their 
roots in climate change but are often not solely and directly correlated to the peace 
and security threats that they helped to bring about. The problem with climate change 
is that most conflicts are only avoidable if their causes are stopped far in advance. If 
climate change triggered a military action, the Council’s decision would often be 
based on that military action and not on the original climate change occurrence. Most 
of the time the developments resulting from climate change are often too vague and 
unclear to declare them as actual threats to peace and security. On the other hand, the 
Security Council is a flexible organ that is limited, besides the UN Charter, only by 
itself.166 It has already proven that it can find new ways to address new forms of 
threats like when it tackled global terrorism for instance. 
 
(a) The Security Council’s attitude towards climate change 
	
Although climate change might be a security issue, it does not automatically 
turn into a Security Council issue.167 Talking about climate change at United Nations 
Security Council meetings was controversial since most members regarded it as an 
issue that was either provocative or irrelevant or both.168 The Security Council held 
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its first-ever debate on climate impacts in 2007.169 This initiative can be traced back 
to the United Kingdom’s Council leadership, the focus on preventive actions within 
conflicts and the overall progress of the concept of international security.170 The 
debate whether the Council is at all the right organ to address climate change has 
been going on since then. Russia and some G77 countries,171 mostly including 
developing countries such as India, South Africa and Brazil do still not support the 
idea that the Council should deal with climate-related issues.172 Since 2007, several 
attempts were made to put climate change on the Council’s agenda, but all of them 
failed.173 When climate issues are handled by the Council at all, this is usually done 
implicitly not explicitly, like during its discussions about water when there was no 
mentioning of the term climate.174 
A question worth considering is whether climate change should be termed a 
sustainable development issue rather than security issue.175 If this was the case 
however, the United Nations Security Council could no longer deal with it as Art 24 
of the UN Charter states that its main function is to maintain peace and security. The 
Security Council itself however linked sustainable development to conflict 
prevention back in 2005.176 It stated that the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the crucial instrument for addressing climate 
change, recalling its provisions.177 But one could argue that actions through the 
UNFCCC might not be sufficient to deal with the multi-layered challenges brought 
about by climate change.178 So far, the UNFCCC itself only issued non-binding 
emissions stabilisation principles.179 Besides, its latest document, the Paris 
Agreement, lost major traction when the United States of America180 and Brazil 
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announced their withdrawals,181 clearly demonstrating a strong need for support from 
other institutions.182  
Over the years, the problem of climate change has come to the forefront 
within the Security Council.183 It has passed various resolutions that mention the 
climate security aspect on some level. The Security Council has recognised 
environmental challenges as a root cause to the conflicts in the Lake Chad Region,184 
in Somalia,185 Mali,186 and Darfur187 and to the stability of West Africa and the Sahel 
region.188 However, it has been neither consistent nor systematic when it comes to 
climate-related security risks.189 
 
(b) The threat to peace and security as an indirect consequence of climate 
change - the problem of accountability and state responsibility 
	
According to Art 39 of the UN Charter, there has to be ‘a threat to the peace’ 
in order for the Council to act. But this might not only include specific instances but 
also situations that generally threaten peace in a fundamental way.190 If the Security 
Council then wants to enact legislation it can only do so if a genuine link between the 
general obligations enacted and the maintenance of international peace and security 
exists.191 Article 34 of the UN Charter states that  
‘the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to 
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.’  
This indicates that complete certainty is not required. Also, it is not legally required 
that the measurements have proven to be post facto effective.192  
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A significant point of critique against Resolutions 1422 and 1487 was that the 
Security Council did not present a tangible link to a peace and security threat.193 
Resolution 1422 was remarkable as it suggested between the lines that the non-
contribution of troops to the United Nations peacekeeping operations would pose a 
threat to international peace and security.194 The link here between threat and action 
is very vague. When looking at Resolution 1540, regarding the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons, the Security Council declared that the abstract action of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction formed a threat to peace and security,195 even if this 
action had not manifested itself as a threat in a concrete form.196 A similar approach 
could be used for climate change. If proliferation of nuclear weapons represented an 
indirect threat, one could argue that the abstract action of rising CO2 emissions by 
states could equally be understood as a threat to peace and security. In order to know 
which member states have to be addressed by the Security Council it is necessary to 
establish the extent of state responsibility regarding such indirect threats. The causes 
and effects of climate change are more visible and easier to identify than the ones of 
terrorism, since it is quite easy to determine which country has contributed to climate 
change to what extent through which levels of CO2 emissions.197 However, scientific 
findings no matter how accurate or widely accepted will never prescribe just one 
solution approach and will provide some leeway in regard to policy responses.198 
By passing Resolution 1373, the Council issued a binding resolution to fight 
terrorism.199 Here it made the reasonable assumption that financing terrorists could 
eventually harm states and that this therefore poses a threat to international peace and 
security.200 In this case the Security Council had not established any level of state 
responsibility for this situation that, later down the causal chain, posed a threat to 
international peace and security. None of the articles in the UN Charter would have 
required it to do this, showing that the Security Council is willing to counteract 
threats regardless from where and from whom they originate. 
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The question whether the Security Council can tackle abstract risks is of great 
importance as it goes hand in hand with the response to those abstract risks through 
abstract-general regulation in the form of legislative measures.201 As Art 1 (1) of the 
UN Charter indicates, maintaining peace and security also includes preventive 
measures that remove the threat. Therefore preventive measures and a proactive 
dimension to the functioning of the Council was always envisioned.202 Already the 
phrasing of Art 39 of the UN Charter of the term ‘threat’ already permits the Council 
to take precautionary action.203 Regarding the different measures of non-military 
actions these are not enumerated exhaustively in Art 41 of the UN Charter and 
include the wording ‘these may include’. This means that a possible action from the 
Council could be the passing of an abstract-general regulation.204 The only 
requirement is that these measures do not involve the use of force.205 
While environmental stress, deepened by climate change, is a factors leads to 
conflict this does not necessarily make it a direct cause of conflict. Environmental 
stress lies further up the causal chain.206 It is quite difficult to anticipate and attribute 
conflicts that have been affected by climate change. Climate change is just one factor 
among many and it usually acts as a threat multiplier.207 When dealing with 
environmental matters, traditional notions regarding the burden of proof cannot 
always be applied. This is due to their high degree of technical complexity.208 
Multidimensional climate risks have therefore to be tackled using a comprehensive 
approach.209 It is almost impossible to put different climate change scenarios and 
how humans will react to them into specific categories.210 This, in turn, makes it 
particularly difficult to anticipate what will trigger instability and therefore poses a 
threat to peace and security. As a result, putting legislative measurements in place, 
that will hinder the outcome, is a difficult undertaking. 
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Another obstacle is the fact that polluters are often private enterprises and not 
states.211 States can however be held responsible for omission if they do not achieve 
the climate targets that they legally agreed to uphold.212 Through stricter legal rules 
that have to enforced by the state, climate change could be reduced. International 
environmental law could force lawmakers and negotiators to experiment with new 
mechanisms and techniques.213 Targeted sanctions through ‘Listing’ processes within 
the fight of terrorism214 as well as Security Council’s resolutions concerning foreign 
terrorist fighters215 have shown that the Security Council does not directly address 
non-state actors but through the member states of the United Nations. This approach 
could easily be used to address private entities when it comes to pollution. The 
Security Council could require states to pass binding legislation to reduce their 
carbon footprint in order to decarbonise the economy across the globe.216 
Alternatively, it could issue specific greenhouse gas emissions targets that states 
would have to obey.217 If states refuse to comply with their given obligations, 
economic sanctions, including import and export bans, could pose an effective 
method.218 This could force them to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.219 Another 
possibility are the so-called commodity-specific sanctions that, by targeting entire 
economic branches, address private enterprises directly and the source of the 
problem. In that way, the Council could ban products that have been produced or 
extracted in environmentally harmful ways or hinder their export from non-
compliant states, also providing incentives for investors to aim for low-carbon 
methods.220 
Another potential angle of argument could be to declare climate change a 
threat to collective security as a threat to one member state is a threat to all.221 While 
Art 1 (1) of the UN Charter challenges the United Nations to ‘take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’, the main 
																																																								
211 Jan Klabbers op cit note 3 at 252. 
212 Art 2 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with 
commentaries Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two. 
213 Jan Klabbers op cit note 3 253. 
214 SC Res. 2368, S/RES/2368 (20 July 2017). 
215 SC Res. 2178, S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014). 
216 Shirley V. Scott op cit note 163 at 1323. 
217 Christopher K. Penny op cit note 164 at 59. 
218 Ibid at 61.	
219 Shirley V. Scott op cit note 163 at 1324; Darragh Conway op cit note 82 at 400. 
220 Darragh Conway op cit note 82 at 400.	




focus of the Security Council has been on crisis management and hard security 
interventions.222 
There are different attitudes towards handling climate change in the Security 
Council. Some countries solely try to raise awareness, while others see climate 
change in a wider understanding of security and are therefore willing to apply a more 
holistic approach. And then there are the small island states that are already threated 
by climate change today and require preventive actions immediately. This raises the 
interesting question whether the Council can only fulfil an advisory rather than an 
authoritative role if one looks at climate change as a non-military threat.223 It might 
not however be enough for the Council to just embody an advisory role without the 
competency to initiate actions that have legal consequences. Although creating 
awareness and putting climate change on the agenda are essential measures, these 
developments are not sufficient to stop the catastrophe of climate change. 
A realistic approach could be to form a cooperation between the Paris 
Compliance Mechanism and the Security Council. The former could identify which 
states have not been complying in their binding obligations to reduce emissions224 
while the latter could enforce sanctions against such perpetrators.225 In case of 
conflicting interests, the Council’s actions would make sure abide by the obligations 
states have under the Paris Agreement.226 In instances relating to terror or nuclear 
weapons, the binding resolutions of the Security Council were accompanied by 
oversight mechanisms, which are possible under Art 29 of the UN Charter.227 This 
says that ‘the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems 
necessary for the performance of its functions.’ A similar ‘Environmental Security 
Committee’ could track the implementation of a resolution regarding emission 
obligations.228 
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It is most likely that the Security Council, instead of setting up specific 
measures, will instead impose emission-limitation requirements.229 When it comes to 
climate change and the effects that it has, concrete circumstances on the ground will 
vary depending on the country and region.230 It is therefore quite challenging to find 
a general legislative solution that can do justice to all the differently affected parties. 
Therefore the Security Council should concentrate its power on one specific and 
simple rule which would benefit all: the reduction of greenhouse emissions. 
In addition, the Security Council needs greater access to risk assessment 
information relating to food insecurity, water insecurity, changes in the world energy 
economy, and disruptions to key commodity supply chains. Currently it does not 
collect any climate-related information from its reports on missions, peacekeeping 
operations and general country information.231 By including climate related 
information in these reports one could achieve great awareness within the Security 
Council with relatively little effort. Another option would be for the Security Council 
to create an Environmental Security Committee that could gather data and supervise 
the various developments made by states.232 
The Security Council must be empowered to take concrete action where 
climate change exacerbate conflicts. To do this a secure and comprehensive 
information base is required. All relevant information must be bundled, processed 
and analytically evaluated and an early warning system should be put in place.  
The Security Council cannot and should not replace the established 
instruments of climate policy. Instead it should complement them.233 An ambitious 
climate policy remains the best way to limit climate risks. But as long as the climate 
goals of the international community are not sufficient to limit global warming to an 
acceptable level, it must address the foreign and security policy consequences of 
climate change.234 It is not a question of whether one single organ can offer the 
solution but instead of how the different layers affected by climate change can be 
handled by varying institutions. Giving the Security Council the power to act upon 
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climate change does not mean that powers are necessarily taken away from other 
United Nations organs. It would be desirable if the Council did not have to act but 
rather be a means of last resort. The Council could use the already existing 
framework and build upon its existing foundation.235 
There is a general fear among member states that the Council could cut state 
sovereignty by introducing prescriptive mitigation measures.236 However, there is 
growing recognition that the Council should not only respond to current crisis but 
also prevent them.237 Once a situation has been identified as a potential future threat, 
the Council should be able to act before it materialises into an actual threat.238 
There have been several instances where preventive measures by the Council 
were indeed successful. These were cases relating to HIV/AIDS, counterterrorism 
and gender.239 In those cases the Council focused on four conflict prevention 
functions including political elevation of root causes, institution-building and reform, 
coordination of the United Nations system and mainstreaming the solutions into 
security operations.240 The Security Council has always evolved and adapted to 
various political developments over time. Its actions did not only include sanctions, 
and the use of force but also the foundation of international criminal tribunals and the 
establishment of peacekeeping missions for instance.241 Just because climate change 
forms an ongoing threat rather than a singular incident, this does not mean that the 
Council is not equipped to resolve it. 
 
(d) How does the scenario of climate change differ from what the Security 
Council usually deals with? 
	
Many destabilising factors in the world present potential threats to peace and 
security, climate change being just one of them. So, why should the Security Council 
spend so much of its focus on climate change? Because climate change is a factor 
that could successfully be tackled through international legal action. Instabilities in 
regions through ethnic tensions, social, cultural or political factors often require 
solutions within countries. Climate change, however, crosses borders and therefore 
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follows in the footsteps of other transnational problems that individual states fail to 
get under control, such as piracy and armed robbery. Here the Council has already 
installed various international tribunals due to national insufficiencies when it comes 
to these issues.242 The same should be done for climate related matters. As climate 
change brings about situations where the origin of a problem and its effects are often 
geographically removed from one another, the installation of tribunals are even more 
necessary. Direct causal links to the ‘victim’ states is often missing.243 This precisely 
makes it precisely a global problem that therefore, can also only be solved globally.  
In the past, the Council had passed resolutions not because of threats to peace 
and security but to achieve other goals.244 These resolutions related to humanitarian 
relief, assisting United Nations personnel on-site and promoting democracy for 
instance.245 Previously discussed Council topics relating to terrorism or HIV/ AIDS 
could show that it would not be unnatural for the Security Council to tackle climate 
change.246  
If the Security Council manages to address terrorists or the very private issues 
surrounding HIV and unprotected sex, HIVs most common method of transmission, 
both topics not subject to domestic regulatory framework,247 it should find it much 
simpler to deal with private agents like enterprises that pollute the environment and 
can very well be controlled by state means. Commercial enterprises that influence 
climate change through production are easier to address through legislative measures 
than terrorists who do not even operate in a legally manageable space. The same 
goes for the private matter that is sexual intercourse where legislators can only go as 
far as to provide protection against sexual transmitted diseases but they cannot 
enforce the actual use of them. One could therefore argue that this makes the area of 
climate change not only easier to govern, but also an area where the Security Council 
specifically has to take action due to the cross-border scale. 
The Security Council is in a unique position as it can address climate security 
challenges and can put them into practice across the United Nations system with its 
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member states.248 There are member states however that argue that climate change 
should be handled by a much more representative organ like the General 
Assembly.249 Climate security issues do not have a dedicated department in the 
United Nations. This however represents a chance for a new form of cooperation 
among the institutions of the United Nations. For instance, the Security Council 
could come together with the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to try and 
deal with the consequences of climate change.250 However, final decisions would 
still have to be made by the Security Council as General Assembly resolutions are 
never as powerful as the binding resolutions that can be issued by the Security 
Council. The Security Council would have to remain the locus of global governance 
with regards to an issue that might call into question the long-term viability of human 
survival.251 One also has to keep in mind that climate agreements are ‘package-
deals’, determining levels of emissions for member state. This means however that 
any lack of unity risks jeopardizing the entire climate undertaking.252 It was never so 
urgent or feasible to have the Security Council intervene on climate change.253 It is 
about time to use the powers of the Council to set new legal rules to cope with 
climate change.254 
 
II. The Security Council’s structural weaknesses and how this affects its actions 
	
This brings me to my next point: the structural weaknesses of the Security 
Council. The political will of the members of the Security Council determines how 
the climate challenge will be answered.255 Just because the UN Charter has delegated 
certain powers to the Security Council, this does not mean that the latter will use 
them to achieve the former’s aim .256  
While all regions are theoretically represented in the Security Council,257 
there remains a strong geographical imbalance as the mostly underdeveloped Global 
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South is only represented as non-permanent members.258 In addition to that, all 
permanent members have reached at least a certain degree of development.  
According to Art 27 of the UN Charter, substantive Council decisions 
requirement a majority of nine votes, including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members, also known as their veto right.259 This procedure has evolved 
over time, and ever since the Korea Crises the ‘concurring vote’ is still upheld 
notwithstanding absence or abstention, meaning a veto has to be expressed 
specifically.260 Decisions of the Security Council are therefore heavily influenced by 
the voting behaviour of the permanent members. To put it frankly: without the 
support of the P5, the Security Council is not able to take action.261 Naturally, the 
Security Council members’ actions are affected by their own interests and that of 
their close allies.262 This creates the risk that the veto powers will block 
enforcements actions that are not in their interest.263 In the past, the Council had 
remained silent when one of its permanent members invaded or attacked another 
member state of the United Nations.264 The five permanent members often put their 
national interests before that of the international community.265 As seen with 
Resolutions 1422, 1487 and 1497, were the United States of America used the 
Council to enforce their national interests, legislative resolutions can result in the 
abuse of power.266 Another problematic component is that the measurements of the 
Council are ‘unbalanced and selective, as they represent only the views of those who 
drafted them.’267  
All five permanent member states are parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change268 as well as to the Paris Agreement.269 
That being said in 2013 and 2015, Russia and China had continuously dismissed an 
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explicit link between climate change and security.270 In 2017 and 2018, China 
supported the widening of the Council’s agenda, taking a more proactive role in 
preventive action. Russia on the other hand refuses to label the issue of climate 
change a responsibility of the Security Council. But it is willing to discuss the topic 
if it appears as one of many factors that cause a specific conflict.271 Recently, the 
United States of America (under President Donald J Trump) is holding a low profile 
when it comes to climate change.272 The current power relations between the United 
States of America and China could further fuel this inactivity of the Council.273 
The following characteristics of the P5 are likely to influence their attitude 
towards climate change:  
 
(a) Permanent members coming from the Global North 
	
As already mentioned in Chapter One, the Global North is far less vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change.274 This could leave the permanent members of the 
Security Council less willing to engage in actions against climate change. Trade 
routes will be opening up in the Arctic.275 These developments are of great potential 
benefit for the US and Russia and could one reason why they don’t necessarily want 
to halt the melting of the ice.  
 
(b) Permanent members being industrialised states 
	
All of the permanent members have reached a high degree of 
industrialisation, which goes hand in hand with pollution and increased CO2 
emissions. This leads to a bias among permanent members when handling climate 
related security issues at the Security Council. Although industrialised countries are 
the biggest consumers of ecological resources and produce the majority of CO2 
emissions globally, their emissions have actually decreased since 2000. Emerging 
economies, particularly Asian countries, have generally seen increases in their 
emissions.276 The Kyoto Protocol tried to tackle the inequality between developing 
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countries and developed countries, the latter being able to afford expensive energy 
alternatives (green energy). This is why the emission targets, as set by to Annex 1 of 
the Kyoto Protocol, only applied to developed countries. This however meant that 
rising developing countries with their steadily increasing pollution was not 
adequately addressed.277 While the main responsibility for stopping climate change 
lies with the wealthier states, an effective solution requires commitment from the 
entire global community.278 
 
(c) Permanent members being the worst perpetrators of climate change 
	
Whereas most industrialised states are ready to use green alternatives, 
emerging industrial powers such as China like to point out that it is their turn to 
freely industrialise even if it that furthers climate change.279 Regulations concerning 
climate change will have a significant impact on states’ core economic and 
development priorities and will result in expensive investments.280 While the costs 
for polluting industries to become climate-neutral are short term and new economic 
opportunities can result, this will still be regarded an economic obstacle and will 
influence states’ voting behaviour in the Security Council.281  
Various permanent members have a hostile attitude towards the Paris 
Agreement and the US has even started their withdrawal.282 If permanent members 
adhere to these climate regulations more strictly, not only would various peace and 
security issues relating to climate change be reduced, but the P5 and the Security 
Council would not have to decide on these matters in the first place.283 Whether the 
Security Council realises this chain of consequences and how this affects the political 
power of its permanent members, will be discussed in the following chapter where I 
will also take a closer look at the various expectations from different stakeholders. 
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E. CHAPTER 4: MECHANISMS TO COUNTER THE SECURITY 
COUNCILS’S LACK OF POLITICAL WILL  
 
After analysing the legal possibilities given to the Security Council, I will 
now try to put them into perspective by looking at the probability of realising them. 
This chapter will therefore look at the context and politics on the ground, realising 
that although legal mechanisms are set in place, as shown in the previous chapter, 
they might not always be enforced. Inherently being political, international law is all 
about which actors make the actual decisions at the end of the day.284 I will try to 
analysis why and under which circumstances the Security Council will most likely 
take action when it comes to climate change related issues. This is very topical, given 
that one of the key questions posed in the run-up to the open debate on climate 
change in 2019 was what role the Council might play in responding early and 
adequately to climate-related disasters.285 One has to keep in mind that as climate 
change security threats become more relevant globally, states may change their 
positions on the issue. 286	
 
I. The reactions and expectations of the international community towards the 
Security Council  
	
Before examining the political intentions of the Council’s member states, it is 
necessary to first analyse what the international community expects from the 
Council. It is important to remember that legislations of the Security Council have 
only been possible in the past because member states chose to create room for 
them.287 Without this willingness by the member states, the Council would not have 
been able to assume such a role. However, this was set up in such a way where the 
United Nations Security Council can set rules for the United Nations member but 
does not have the authority to enforce them if a state is disobedient. This creates a 
dependency of the Council on the goodwill of the member states of the United 
Nations. The Security Councils’ actions will always be influenced, at least to a 
certain degree, by what the global community expects from it. 
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A significant concern is that, by extending the scope of the Council to non-
traditional security threats such as climate change, the Security Council could lose 
what is granted to it under Art 24 of the UN Charter: ‘prompt and effective action’ as 
one of its primary responsibilities.288 Therefore, one could argue that the Security 
Council’s role regarding climate change should only be in the short-term manner for 
which the Security Council was intended.289 In addition, if the Security Council 
legislates, this could undermine all of international law because the Council does not 
represent a legitimate source of international law or because it would present 
international lawmaking as slow and uncertain.290 Some smaller countries dismiss 
the Council’s intervention, arguing that its decision making is too strongly influenced 
by big power politics.291 However, actions by the Council could be accepted if the 
need to fill a gap in international law becomes too big or too urgent.292 This necessity 
could even lead to member states expecting or pressuring the Council to tackle the 
current climate crises.  
 
(a) Climate change affected countries 
	
Security-wise, climate change will affect some countries more than others293 
and sooner or later the consequences of climate change – by leading to security 
issues - will catch up with the Council.294 As already stated in the previous chapter, 
for the most affected countries today climate change is already a security issue.295 
These countries are however in the minority and politically weak. This makes it 
difficult for them to have a significant political impact and force the Council to act. 
 
(b) Developing countries 
	
Many developing countries stress that climate change should rather be seen as 
a topic of sustainable development. By taking this issue up, the Security Council 
would interfere with other United Nation bodies such as the General Assembly, the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, and the United Nations Commission 
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on Sustainable Development. Developing countries are alarmed that with such 
behaviour, the Council would change the rules of the game.296 Countries like China, 
Venezuela and Saudi Arabia have furthermore stated their fear of losing sovereignty 
in their development choices.297 Venezuela went as far as stating that the interference 
of the Security Council would violate the state’s sovereignty and its right to do as it 
likes with its natural resources.298 It is evident that climate change is not a national 
priority for developing countries and that they fear that by having to cut down on 
greenhouse gas emissions is increasing their insecurities by slowing down their 
economic development.299 
Many developing countries are of the opinion that ‘all parties - developed and 
developing - should implement their commitments according to the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, and not according to the principle of 
‘shared responsibilities’.300 However, the responsibility for climate change has 
shifted recently and a lot of emerging economies are now enormous contributors to 
green gas emissions.301 However, it is more difficult for these countries to reduce 
their carbon footprint as they often lack the financial means to do so. Instead, many 
of them believe that they should be allowed to industrialise just like the developed 
industrialised countries have.302 While this is true, these countries are often 
themselves affected by climate change. To invest in more expensive but emission 
friendly technology could be a win-win situation for them in the long-term. Sticking 
to the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle could be a realistic 
approach as it has worked before in another context with the division of financial 
dues.303 There is a tendency to solve collective problems by allowing less solvent 
states a more voluntary role while they benefit just as much as developed states that 
have to contribute to the goal fully. Less able countries are given a so-called ‘free- 
ride’ in order to achieve the objective collectively.304 
Although there is justified criticism about the violation of state sovereignty of 
non-council members and subjective behaviour of council members, one has to keep 
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in mind that the Security Council was created to address emergency situations. There 
is a reason why a forum was created where fewer states would get to have a say in 
order to reach consent sooner and more easily. This institution is not meant to 
incarnate participatory democracy of sovereign states. It is intended to produce 
efficient solutions.305 If Security Council Resolutions were based on the consent of 
all the member states of the United Nations in a democratic manner, there would not 
be a need for the Council in the first place, since a treaty on the specific topic would 
already be in force. But the disunity concerning climate change shows that this kind 
of forum might be needed more than ever before. This does not mean however, that 
the different stages of development of member states should not be taken into 
consideration. Just like with the Kyoto Protocol, the Security Council could go ahead 
and impose different obligations for different stakeholders.306 
 
II. Which circumstances could force the Security Council to act? 
	
Convincing the international community that the Security Council should 
take action against climate change is not sufficient however, if the Council itself 
refuses to act. There is no obligation for the Security Council to identify a particular 
situation as a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression, as the wording 
under Art 39 of the UN Charter ‘shall determine’ identifies.307 It is for this reason, 
that I will now lay out under what circumstances the Security Council could decide 
to become active in the fight against climate change. 
A youth representative called upon the Security Council to officially 
recognise climate change as a threat to peace and security during the open debate in 
January 2019.308 Notably, 70 per cent of the United Nations member states have 
declared climate change a threat to security on a national level.309 Keeping this in 
mind, one might ask how long the Security Council can continue to look the other 
way when it comes to climate-related security risks. The European Union’s High 
Representative and the European Commission to the European Council calls for the 
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multilateral arena to focus on security risks related to climate change, emphasizing 
the Security Council’s responsibility here.310 
Some voices claim that the powers of the Security Council are not subject to 
quantifiable limitation.311 And without determining whether this is true, one might 
have to realise that the Council’s power is dependent on the United Nations member 
states’ adherence to the resolutions is passes. This means that the Council can only 
act decisively as long as the member states, by implementing its decisions, will allow 
it to. This turns out to be a balancing act for the Council between using its powers 
but also maintaining them by sticking to its designated role.312 A resolution is only 
binding on member states if it adheres to Art 25 of the UN Charter which forces the 
Council to act within certain boundaries if it wants its decisions to be obeyed.313 
Although the Council is theoretically an independent organ of the United Nations, it 
does act on behalf of the United Nations members according to Art 24 of the UN 
Charter and can legally not be completely removed from member states’ interests.314 
As a matter of fact its actions are limited by realpolitik.315 There are various 
conditions for legitimate international legislation, some of procedural, some of 
substantive nature. The topic has to be of certain urgency since legislation is 
established without taking into account the normal treaty-making process.316 
Moreover, it is of utter importance that resolutions concerning the whole of the 
international community issued by the Council alone find broader support among 
non-member states,317 since all United Nations members are bound by the resolution 
even without their consent.318  
Even if one comes to the conclusion that the Council is not legally bound to 
act this way - a claim that is already quite debatable, as discussed already319 - the 
missing consent of other United Nations member states often raises the request to 
pass legislative resolutions by consensus.320 Furthermore, it is not uncommon that 
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specific agendas are pushed at a regional level first before entering the international 
stage at the Security Council. A pioneer in that regard has been the African Union, 
which has discussed the link between climate change and security in Africa.321 
Sometimes it is argued that in the run-up to legislative resolutions non-Security 
Council member states should be able to express their views and perceptions as 
well.322 Art 31 of the UN Charter actually agrees with this and most of the time the 
Council is simply unable to enforce legislation that is unpopular among the members 
of the United Nations.323 If it acts beyond its legal boundaries, states might just not 
implement its decisions.324 Opening up the Council by introducing consultations with 
non-Security Council members and open meetings, the Council is trying to react to 
the widespread criticism it regularly faces.325 The Security Council has no possibility 
to enforce unpopular decrees, but if there is general approval of a resolution, the 
pressure on member states to fulfil the legislation will rise.326 However, if the 
support is lacking, compliance and implementation will prove to be poor, hence 
weakening the binding powers of the Council as a result.327 This shows that the 
Council on the one hand and the receiving member states on the other are 
interdependent. When deciding on a highly political question the Council has to 
balance the need to find a wider consensuses on a topic and the efficiency that comes 
from a smaller group of states. This is made clear by the technical problem that there 
are only about 20 experts that guard the implementation of Council resolutions in 
around 195 states.328 Maybe a reform of the Security Council would play in its 
favour, strengthening its legitimacy and the effectiveness of its decisions. This could 
lead to new and creative opportunities, and effective rules to resolve global 
challenges such as climate change.329 
 
III. The role of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
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One might wonder whether it would even make a difference if the Security 
Council passed binding resolutions that tackle climate change. If member states 
cannot come to an agreement through an international treaty, why should they obey 
decisions made by only a handful of states? Maybe a change of perspective is 
needed, one where the relationship between the United Nations and its member states 
is more seen as a symbiotic and synergetic one rather than a conflictual one.330 After 
all, the Security Council might be more open to criticism than its reputation suggests. 
The outrage following the terrorists listing resolutions resulted in the 1267 
Committee willing to reform its system once states and other entities stood up 
against it.331 And although this achievement took several years of outrage and non-
co-operation, it shows that there is some acknowledged dependency from the 
Council’s side. The Security Council’s effectiveness increases when its working in 
tandem with complementary interventions from other United Nations bodies such as 
the General Assembly or the Secretary-General.332 One of the reasons for Antonio 
Guterres’ nomination as Secretary-General was his prioritizing of preventive 
action.333 This could greatly support for a change in climate change agenda within 
the Security Council. 
A solution might be to adopt a two-track approach, achieving General 
Assembly resolutions as well as Security Council resolutions at the same time. In 
instances where agreements do not reach complete consensus but have managed to 
find a shared understanding of the critical points of the issue, the Security Council 
might be able to ‘co-legislate’ with the General Assembly by drawing from its 
affirmative vote.334 One could allow the Security Council to legislate in cooperation 
with the General Assembly. The latter would make sure that the legislation, in form 
of a binding resolution, reflects the will of the majority of states,335 even though, 
legally speaking, the Council would not be dependent on this procedure.336 Council 
interventions might hereby become more legitimate and politically feasible.337 A 
good example of this is the legislative Security Council Resolution 1373 about 
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terrorism. Here criticism against this resolution from member states was limited338 
which was also reflected in a previous similar resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly.339  
Other voices say that greater involvement of the General Assembly would 
harm the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations in general due to the 
often-occurring disunity between the member states.340 Involvement of the General 
Assembly might be inevitable, though. It could take action into its own hands as it 
had done before with the Uniting Peace Resolution before. Here it stated that it ‘shall 
consider the matter immediately’ if the Security Council ‘fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.’341 If the 
members of the Council know that disagreements regarding climate change would 
mean losing power to the Assembly, this could function as a catalyser to act fast. The 
Uniting for Peace procedure may therefore form a possible tool in the fight against 
climate change.342 While these developments can be seen as a threat to western 
powers,343 they also represent a chance to tackle problems the P5 members are 
politically not interested in solving. 
Due to the Council’s fear of losing power to the General Assembly through a 
possible Uniting for Peace procedure, the latter is able to pressure the former.344 
Without deciding whether climate change is a topic that should be dealt with in 
connection to development, one might state that when it comes to legislating, the 
General Assembly might, in any case, be the more suitable organ. Art 13 of the UN 
Charter assigns the General Assembly the task of ‘encouraging the progressive 
development of international law.’345 However, the Security Council remains the 
only organ that can impose binding actions and this is why the General Assembly 
functions more as the international community’s moral indignation.346 If the latter 
uses this role wisely, however, it can also make a difference. 
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IV. Further possible undertakings 
	
Although the past has shown that the General Assembly proves to be the 
organ most capable of forming a strong opposite pole to the Security Council, more 
United Nations organs and institutions should be considered when it comes to 
tackling climate change.  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) could play a significant role if the 
Security Council requests an opinion on the legality or illegality of states’ actions or 
inactions regarding climate change.347 This could strengthen the legal basis for action 
by the Security Council. An alternative possibility could be the establishment of a 
criminal tribunal for environmental crimes like ‘ecocide’.348 
In late 2018 a United Nations tool, the ‘Climate Security Mechanism’, was 
created. It is a pilot coordination mechanism for climate and security and is supposed 
to assist the Security Council and other United Nations bodies with integrated 
climate risk assessments. In addition, the independent Expert Working Group on 
Climate-Related Security Risks could also provide information. 349 Both initiatives 
are relatively new and small, but they could provide a further climate change 
solution.  
A less controversial starting point for the Council could be to issue binding 
resolutions for already existing climate obligations that have not been fulfilled.350 
This would leave the UNFCCC process fully functional and independent with the 
exception that non-compliant states could be referred to the scrutiny of the Security 
Council.351 While it is debatable whether this approach will make the reluctant state 
fulfil its commitment, it would generally combine the broader legitimacy of the 
UNFCCC with the Chapter VII powers of the Council in a way that could enable 
future solutions to the climate crises.352 
All these different options arising from the different United Nations 
institutions should not be regarded as alternative solutions but instead as additional 
approaches that can be combined. Otherwise, initiatives like the Climate Security 
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Mechanism bear the risk of becoming more passive.353 When it comes to climate 
change it is important to establish that all institutions have to take responsibility and 




The United Nations Security Council’s attitude towards climate change will 
remain an interesting development to watch. What has however become clear is that 
climate change will impact international security not in the distant future but has 
already started to affect us today.354 Climate change is moving fast - faster than we 
are - and that is why there is a need for the United Nations Security Council to do its 
part to help humankind keep pace.355 Some could argue that it is not only 
appropriate, but even imperative for the Council to intervene.356 Never before has the 
timing been more crucial. It is time to realise ‘that we are the first generation to fully 
understand climate change and the last generation to be able to do something about 
it.’357 
In a very recent statement during a United Nations Security Council Open 
Debate, Germany, a Security Council member until 2021, encouraged the Council to 
address new threats to peace and security, including the effects of climate change in 
line with the Charter of the United Nations.358 Germany had previously stated that a 
Security Council Initiative on Climate and Security is overdue and that it become 
part of the climate policy as a whole. Where climate change threatens people's 
livelihoods, the international community must take action before conflicts break out. 
It must be possible for the Security Council to take action here too.359  
I have established that legally speaking the Security Council is able to take 
measures to tackle what is probably the most complicated and complex problem of 
our century. Securitisation of climate related issues may lead to fast and expensive 
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responses rather then cost-effective and sustainable options.360 This raises the 
question whether we have the time for the low-level approach or whether a mixture 
of both, one that is fast but sustainable, is necessary. 
It goes without saying that Security Council actions under Chapter VII would 
remain an extreme response to the complex problem that is climate change.361 It is 
evident that Council legislation is emergency legislation.362 And while the Security 
Council has a large number of critics, the worsening of the climate situation will 
make less popular solutions become more desirable in the future. 363 Climate change 
could become the prime driving force behind an increasingly interdependent 
international community in which legislative resolutions by the Security Council has 
become a valuable tool.364  
In conclusion, it is important to remember, that while the Security Council 
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